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LAnoa LAw-LAnoa-MANAGEMBNT RELATIONS Aar-ENcoURAGEMBNT OF
UmoN MEMBERSIDP AND EMPLOYER'S lNTENT AS ELEMENTS oF UNLAWFUL DrsCRIMINATION-ln the first of three cases involving employer encouragement of
union membership the National Labor Relations Board held that a union had
violated section 8(b)(2) of the amended National Labor Relations Act1 by
inducing an employer to refuse to hire a union member who had failed
comply with the union's rules as to job clearances. The Court of Appeals for

to

11,abor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat L. 141, §8(b)(2) (1947), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §l58(b)(2). This section makes it an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization "to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of" §8(a)(3) [61 Stat. L. 140, §8(a)(3) (1947),
29 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §l58(a)(3)], which provides that it shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer "by discrimination . • • to encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization."
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the Second Circcit rejected the union's contention that the employer's action
was not such as to encourage union membership and enforced the Board's
order.2 In the second case a union was found by the board to nave violated
section 8(b)(2) by causing an employer to refuse certain work assignments to
a union member who was delinquent in paying union dues. The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order on the
ground that it was not supported by substantial evidence that the discrimination had encouraged union membership.3 In the third case an employer, in
response to pressure by the union, which was the employees' exclusive bargaining agent, granted union members more favorable wage treatment than nonmembers. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the Board's
decision that the employer had thereby violated section 8(a)(3), in spite of
the fact that the union involved was a closed one, ordinarily admitting to
membership only first-born sons of members, and even though the employer
had not been motivated by any desire to encourage union membership.4 On
certiorari, held, first and third cases affirmed, second case reversed, with Justices
Black and Douglas dissenting. Section 8(a)(3) forbids only such discrimination as encourages or discourages union membership, but the term "membership" encompasses any participation in union activities. No direct proof of
encouragement or discouragement is necessary in cases in which such result
may reasonably be inferred. The employer's motive is immaterial where encouragement or discouragement is a natural consequence of the discrimination.5
Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Gaynor News Co. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 74 S.Ct. 323 (1954).
In upholding the decision of the NLRB in each of the three principal cases
the Supreme Court has resolved two major issues involving the application of
section 8(a)(3) to employer encouragement of union membership. The first
of these problems stems from the fact that section 8(a)(3) does not in terms
prohibit discrimination simpliciter, but only such discrimination as encourages
or discourages union membership. As an original proposition it is rather difficult to understand how discrimination which is directed against an employee
who is and remains a union member can be said to encourage union membership. The Supreme Court, however, disposed of the argument to this effect
advanced by the unions in Teamsters and Radio Officers by construing the
statutory language "membership in any labor organization" to include not only
adhesion to membership but also participation in any union activities. As a
result of this interpretation, the Court was able to characterize as reasonable the
Board's inference of encouragement in these two cases, since the discrimination
involved was obviously calculated to encourage such union activities as prompt
2 NLRB v. Radio Officers' Union, (2d Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 960.
3 NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, (8th Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) I.
4 NLRB v. Gaynor News Co., (2d Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 719.
5 The Court also held that it was not improper for the Board to proceed against the

union without joining the employer, and that a back pay order against the union was
justified even in the absence of an order requiring that the employee be reinstated.
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payment of dues and adherence to union rules regarding hiring practices. The
Court then went on to hold that direct proof of encouragement or discouragement is unnecessary where such fact may reasonably be inferred.6 The net
result of these two holdings seems to be the elimination, for most if not all
practical purposes, of the encouragement-discouragement requirement in cases
in which discrimination based upon union activities is established.
The second major issue presented by the instant cases involved the contention, accepted by Justices Black and Douglas, that section 8(a)(3) is not
violated unless the employer discriminates in order to encourage or discourage
unionism. Thus the minority felt that no unlawful discrimination had occurred
or been caused in any of the three principal cases because in each the employer
had acted, not from any pro-union motivation, but only in response to union
pressure. The majority, however, while emphasizing the importance of the
employer's motivation, applied the common law rule of intent7 and held that
the employer must be presumed to have intended encouragement of union
membership, since this was the natural and foreseeable consequence of his
conduct. What the majority apparently meant is that an employer's actual
purpose is significant only in determining the existence of discrimination based
upon union activities;8 and that therefore in cases such as the instant ones,
where this type of discrimination is conceded, actual motivation is completely
immaterial. As a matter of legislative history, at least, the Court seems to have
come to the correct conclusion with respect to both of the main issues in these
cases.9 What is more, even if the Court had not been willing to give section
8(a)(3) such a broad construction, a finding of illegality might well have been
reached by reference solely to sections 8(a)(l) and 8(b)(l)(A).10 By striking
down what could therefore be considered merely technical defenses the instant decision will make it possible for the Board and the courts of appeals
to concentrate henceforth upon the real merits of alleged discrimination cases.

George B. Berridge, S.Ed.
6 In upholding the Board's inference as applied to the Gaynor case the Court noted
that union admission policies are not necessarily static, and stated that the act does not
require that a "change in employees' 'quantum of desire' to join a union have immediate
manifestations." Principal case at 51.
7 For a discussion of the common law treatment of the intent problem see HoLMBs,
THE CoMMON I.Aw 51 et seq. (1923).
8 Here the employer's real motive is crucial because if the basis upon which he discriminates is not in any way related to organizational activities, there is no reason theoretically at least why union membership would be encouraged or discouraged.
9 As to the meaning of "membership" see S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st sess.,
p. 11 (1935); H. Rep. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st sess., p. 17 (1935). As to employer's
intent see H. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 44 (1947). Under the minority
view regarding intent §8(b)(2) would obviously become almost a dead letter.
10 These sections make it an unfair labor practice for either an employer or a union
to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their organizational rights. Certainly
no distinction is drawn by these sections between "membership" and other union activities.
For a general discussion of the two sections see FoRKoscH, A TREATISE ON LAnoR I.Aw
§§267, 273 (1953).

